Politics & Governance / Public Policy / Education Policy

财政竞争：中国农村学校消失背后的隐秘原因|The Hidden Driver Behind the Disappearance of Rural Schools in China

这项研究利用中国**“农村学校布局调整（撤点并校）”与“经济特区（SEZ）”建设这两大政策的叠加背景，考察了地方政府间的财政竞争与协调行为。研究通过空间断点设计发现，当乡镇与其邻近的特区属于同一地级市时，政府倾向于协同决策**，通过撤并更多学校来迫使人口向特区迁移以提升整体经济效益。相反，若乡镇与邻近特区属于不同城市，地方政府则会通过维持公共服务水平进行财政竞争，以留住本地劳动力。数据显示，采取协调策略的乡镇比竞争型乡镇额外多撤并了约15%的小学，并导致了更高的人口流出。此外，政治晋升激励显著强化了这种行为，年轻官员在推动特区协调或维护本地竞争方面表现得更为积极。该研究为理解中国地方政府的策略互动及其对公共品供给和城镇化进程的影响提供了因果证据。|This study leverages the overlapping context of China's two major policies—"The Adjustment of Rural School Layout (Consolidation of Schools)" and "Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Construction"—to examine fiscal competition and coordination among local governments. Using a spatial regression discontinuity design, the research finds that when a township and its adjacent SEZ belong to the same prefecture-level city, governments tend to coordinate their decisions. They close more schools to force population migration toward the SEZ, thereby enhancing overall economic efficiency. Conversely, if a township and its neighboring SEZ belong to different cities, local governments engage in fiscal competition by maintaining public service levels to retain local labor. Data shows that townships adopting a coordination strategy closed approximately 15% more primary schools than those in competitive settings, resulting in higher population outflow. Furthermore, political promotion incentives significantly reinforce this behavior, with younger officials being more proactive in either facilitating SEZ coordination or defending local competition. This study provides causal evidence for understanding strategic interactions among local Chinese governments and their impact on public good provision and the urbanization process.