Politics & Governance / International Politics / War & Conflict

Prisoners-Korean Armistice Negotiations and the U.S. Policy of Voluntary Repatriation of Prisoners

Chang Cheng

Korean Armistice Negotiations and the U.S. Policy of "Voluntary Repatriation" of Prisoners of War By thoroughly examining declassified archives from the United States, China, and the Soviet Union, this article reveals that the core deadlock in the later stages of the Korean War stemmed from the U.S. policy of "voluntary repatriation" of prisoners of war. It divides the entire war into two phases: "fighting for territory" and "fighting for prisoners of war." The author Chang Cheng points out that although the Geneva Conventions mandate the full repatriation of all prisoners of war, U.S. President Harry S. Truman, driven by humanitarian and ideological considerations, hastily and firmly established this policy as a "non-negotiable" final position—without a thorough understanding of conditions inside POW camps and without anticipating China’s tough response. This decision-making process was marked by irrationality and contingency. It not only reflected intense infighting between the U.S. Department of State and the military but also exposed the leadership’s "ostrich mentality" in ignoring chaos within POW camps. Ultimately, this policy prolonged the armistice negotiations by an additional fifteen months, resulting in massive and unnecessary casualties. It also unexpectedly gave the Chiang Kai-shek regime, which had been on the verge of collapse, a lifeline by accepting a large number of prisoners of war who chose to go to Taiwan.