Politics & Governance / Law & Institutions / Judicial Systems

法官辞职做律师-中国律师旋转门|Law and Economics Intersected: Chinese Lawyers' Revolving Door

这些资料探讨了中国司法系统中**“旋转门”律师**（即辞去公职后从事律师业务的前法官）对审判结果的影响。研究指出，在案情几乎完全相同的情况下，聘请这类律师能显著提升**8%至23%的胜诉率**，这种优势源于其扎实的**专业法律知识**（Know-how）和深厚的**人脉关系网络**（Know-who）。数据表明，当他们在原任职法院面对**前同事**审理案件时，这种“主场优势”表现得最为明显。尽管旋转门律师能通过更精准的证据整理提高**司法效率**，但其资源倾向于服务**大型企业**，可能导致法律资源不对等并加剧**司法偏差**。该研究通过**博弈论模型**模拟发现，只有当市场上此类精英律师达到足够规模形成**均势对抗**时，司法结果的公平性才会回归。总而言之，理解这类律师的**行为激励**，是完善法治经济、通过司法公正促进经济增长的关键环节。|These materials examine the impact of "revolving door lawyers"—former judges who resign from public office to practice law—on trial outcomes within China’s judicial system. The research indicates that in cases with nearly identical merits, retaining such lawyers can significantly boost the success rate by 8% to 23%, an advantage stemming from their solid professional legal know-how and extensive personal network connections (know-who). Data shows that this "home-court advantage" is most pronounced when they handle cases at their former courts presided over by former colleagues. While revolving door lawyers can improve judicial efficiency through more precise evidence organization, their resources tend to serve large enterprises, which may lead to an imbalance in legal resources and exacerbate judicial bias. Simulations using a game theory model in the research reveal that the fairness of judicial outcomes can only be restored when the number of such elite lawyers in the market reaches a sufficient scale to form balanced competition. In summary, understanding the behavioral incentives of these lawyers is a crucial step in improving the rule of law in the economy and promoting economic growth through judicial impartiality.